We keep track of the scientific literature revolving around ecological collapse, limits to growth and existential risks.
The idea behind this “bibliography of collapse” is to provide students, scholars, artists, transitioners, collapsniks, preppers, survivalists, aquoibonnistes …with a tool to help you weave your own thread of inquiries into the most pressing philosophical and material issue of our time.
As of May 2018, the bibliography contains more than 3000 entries : scientific articles , reports, thesis or academic books. A few blog posts and newspaper articles are also included (mainly on energy). We believe that it is a reasonably accurate picture of the past and current discussions published within the peer-reviewed literature. Some topics such as climate change and biodiversity are not fully covered (otherwise it would add tens of thousand articles to the database).
Do we miss something big? Please let us know via our contact form or Twitter
Pdf’s can be found via ggle scholar, academia, researchgate, #icanhazpdf, libgen, etc…
This is the first version of the database. Tags are something that we need to work on. We will also produce a thorough bibliometric analysis (first trial: see img’s above and below, click to enlarge).
@article{khan_inequality_2018,
title = {Inequality and energy: Revisiting the relationship between disparity of income distribution and energy use from a complex systems perspective},
author = {Fouad Khan and Paul Heinecker},
url = {https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2214629618303074},
doi = {10.1016/j.erss.2018.03.026},
issn = {2214-6296},
year = {2018},
date = {2018-08-01},
urldate = {2018-04-10},
journal = {Energy Research & Social Science},
volume = {42},
pages = {184--192},
abstract = {To consider the impacts of economic inequality on energy consumption efficiency we need indicators that take into account the complexity of the economic and energy systems. We also need decision support tools that help incorporate such indicators into policy analysis. Drawing inspiration from urban studies and ecology, in this paper we develop a scaling indicator for income disparity in national economies that is a measure of system complexity and does not presuppose any distribution as ideal. The scaling indicator is calculated for 2010 income distribution data for countries. We show that rising disparity – measured using this indicator calculated; a) for distributions of incomes across consecutive twentieth percentiles of population in national economies and; b), for distributions of population density in census blocks in metropolitan statistical areas affects energy consumption efficiency in a diametrically different manner in cities and nation states leading to a higher urban carbon footprint while increasing energy efficiency nationally. The different nature of these two systems explains the results. We then modify tools for visualizing complexity from urban studies and ecology to explore the correlation between income disparity and energy efficiency in national economies.},
keywords = {energy, inequality},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
To consider the impacts of economic inequality on energy consumption efficiency we need indicators that take into account the complexity of the economic and energy systems. We also need decision support tools that help incorporate such indicators into policy analysis. Drawing inspiration from urban studies and ecology, in this paper we develop a scaling indicator for income disparity in national economies that is a measure of system complexity and does not presuppose any distribution as ideal. The scaling indicator is calculated for 2010 income distribution data for countries. We show that rising disparity – measured using this indicator calculated; a) for distributions of incomes across consecutive twentieth percentiles of population in national economies and; b), for distributions of population density in census blocks in metropolitan statistical areas affects energy consumption efficiency in a diametrically different manner in cities and nation states leading to a higher urban carbon footprint while increasing energy efficiency nationally. The different nature of these two systems explains the results. We then modify tools for visualizing complexity from urban studies and ecology to explore the correlation between income disparity and energy efficiency in national economies.
@article{garnett_total_2018,
title = {Total systemic failure?},
author = {Philip Garnett},
url = {https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0048969718300950},
doi = {10.1016/j.scitotenv.2018.01.075},
issn = {0048-9697},
year = {2018},
date = {2018-06-01},
urldate = {2018-02-24},
journal = {Science of The Total Environment},
volume = {626},
pages = {684--688},
abstract = {While the world argues about whether climate change is real, what if all systems are failing? This paper seeks to ignite further discussion concerning human impact on all aspects of our environment as we move further into the Anthropocene, not only in terms of the pressure we produce, but also how our activity changes the nature of the relationships between Earth's systems. The paper suggests that we currently lack the tools and analytical capacity to understand the significance of these changes and therefore we cannot answer the question, “are all systems failing?”. We discuss how complexity theory, complex networks, and Artificial Intelligence, could contribute part of a solution.},
keywords = {limits-to-growth, systemic-risks},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
While the world argues about whether climate change is real, what if all systems are failing? This paper seeks to ignite further discussion concerning human impact on all aspects of our environment as we move further into the Anthropocene, not only in terms of the pressure we produce, but also how our activity changes the nature of the relationships between Earth's systems. The paper suggests that we currently lack the tools and analytical capacity to understand the significance of these changes and therefore we cannot answer the question, “are all systems failing?”. We discuss how complexity theory, complex networks, and Artificial Intelligence, could contribute part of a solution.
@article{wachtmeister_oil_2018,
title = {Oil projections in retrospect: Revisions, accuracy and current uncertainty},
author = {Henrik Wachtmeister and Petter Henke and Mikael Höök},
url = {http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0306261918303428},
doi = {10.1016/j.apenergy.2018.03.013},
issn = {0306-2619},
year = {2018},
date = {2018-06-01},
urldate = {2018-04-05},
journal = {Applied Energy},
volume = {220},
pages = {138--153},
abstract = {Scenarios and projections are important for decision and policy making. Accuracy of past projections can be useful for both scenario users and developers, for insight on current projection uncertainty, and for guiding improvement efforts. This paper compiles projections of oil production, oil prices and upstream investments from the years 2000 to 2016 from the annual World Energy Outlook by the International Energy Agency, and investigates revisions and accuracy of past projections and implied uncertainty of current ones. Revisions of world oil production, price and investments have been motivated by a combination of demand and supply factors. Downward revisions are mainly allocated to OPEC, while recent upward revisions are due to unconventional oil, in particular US tight oil. Non-OPEC conventional projections have been stable. Price and investments have been revised mostly upwards. Projection accuracy follows the size and directions of these revisions, with high accuracy for Non-OPEC (mean absolute percentage error of 4.8% on a 5 year horizon) and low for OPEC (8.9%) and unconventional (37%). Counteracting error directions contribute to accurate total World oil supply projections (4%) while price projections have low accuracy (37%). Scenario users should be aware of implied uncertainty of current oil projections. In planning and decision making, uncertainty ranges such as those presented here can be used as benchmarks. Scenario developers should focus improvements efforts on three areas in particular: tight oil, OPEC and new technology.},
keywords = {energy, fossil, limits, oil, scenarios},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
Scenarios and projections are important for decision and policy making. Accuracy of past projections can be useful for both scenario users and developers, for insight on current projection uncertainty, and for guiding improvement efforts. This paper compiles projections of oil production, oil prices and upstream investments from the years 2000 to 2016 from the annual World Energy Outlook by the International Energy Agency, and investigates revisions and accuracy of past projections and implied uncertainty of current ones. Revisions of world oil production, price and investments have been motivated by a combination of demand and supply factors. Downward revisions are mainly allocated to OPEC, while recent upward revisions are due to unconventional oil, in particular US tight oil. Non-OPEC conventional projections have been stable. Price and investments have been revised mostly upwards. Projection accuracy follows the size and directions of these revisions, with high accuracy for Non-OPEC (mean absolute percentage error of 4.8% on a 5 year horizon) and low for OPEC (8.9%) and unconventional (37%). Counteracting error directions contribute to accurate total World oil supply projections (4%) while price projections have low accuracy (37%). Scenario users should be aware of implied uncertainty of current oil projections. In planning and decision making, uncertainty ranges such as those presented here can be used as benchmarks. Scenario developers should focus improvements efforts on three areas in particular: tight oil, OPEC and new technology.
@article{susnik_data-driven_2018,
title = {Data-driven quantification of the global water-energy-food system},
author = {Janez Sušnik},
url = {http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S092134491830082X},
doi = {10.1016/j.resconrec.2018.02.023},
issn = {09213449},
year = {2018},
date = {2018-06-01},
urldate = {2018-04-05},
journal = {Resources, Conservation and Recycling},
volume = {133},
pages = {179--190},
abstract = {There is increasing interest in the global water-energy-food (WEF) system and potential system trajectories, especially considering growing concerns over resource exploitation and sustainability. Previous studies investigating different aspects of this system have a number of shortcomings, meaning it is difficult to identify system-wide tradeoffs, and makes comparison difficult. A global analysis of the WEF system linked to gross domestic product (GDP) growth is presented, integrating the four sectors into a coherent analysis and modelling framework. GDP was included as previous related work demonstrates a link between GDP and each WEF sector. A system dynamics modelling approach quantifies previously qualitative descriptions of the global WEF-GDP system, while a Monte-Carlo sampling approach is adopted to characterise national-level variability in resource use. Correlative and causal analysis show links of varying strength between sectors. For example, the GDPelectricity consumption sectors are strongly correlated while food production and electricity consumption are weakly correlated. Causal analysis reveals that ‘correlation does not imply causation’. There are noticeable asymmetries in causality between certain sectors. Historical WEF-GDP values are well recreated. Future scenarios were assessed using seven GDP growth estimates to 2100. Water withdrawals in 2100 and food production in 2050 are close to other estimations. Results suggest that humanity risks exceeding the ‘safe operating space’ for water withdrawal. Reducing water withdrawal while maintaining or increasing food production is critical, and should be decoupled from economic growth. This work provides a quantitative modelling framework to previously qualitative descriptions of the WEF-GDP system, offering a platform on which to build.},
keywords = {agriculture-food-famine, energy, water},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
There is increasing interest in the global water-energy-food (WEF) system and potential system trajectories, especially considering growing concerns over resource exploitation and sustainability. Previous studies investigating different aspects of this system have a number of shortcomings, meaning it is difficult to identify system-wide tradeoffs, and makes comparison difficult. A global analysis of the WEF system linked to gross domestic product (GDP) growth is presented, integrating the four sectors into a coherent analysis and modelling framework. GDP was included as previous related work demonstrates a link between GDP and each WEF sector. A system dynamics modelling approach quantifies previously qualitative descriptions of the global WEF-GDP system, while a Monte-Carlo sampling approach is adopted to characterise national-level variability in resource use. Correlative and causal analysis show links of varying strength between sectors. For example, the GDPelectricity consumption sectors are strongly correlated while food production and electricity consumption are weakly correlated. Causal analysis reveals that ‘correlation does not imply causation’. There are noticeable asymmetries in causality between certain sectors. Historical WEF-GDP values are well recreated. Future scenarios were assessed using seven GDP growth estimates to 2100. Water withdrawals in 2100 and food production in 2050 are close to other estimations. Results suggest that humanity risks exceeding the ‘safe operating space’ for water withdrawal. Reducing water withdrawal while maintaining or increasing food production is critical, and should be decoupled from economic growth. This work provides a quantitative modelling framework to previously qualitative descriptions of the WEF-GDP system, offering a platform on which to build.
@article{wang_emotions_2018,
title = {Emotions predict policy support: Why it matters how people feel about climate change},
author = {Susie Wang and Zoe Leviston and Mark Hurlstone and Carmen Lawrence and Iain Walker},
url = {http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S095937801731004X},
doi = {10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2018.03.002},
issn = {09593780},
year = {2018},
date = {2018-05-01},
urldate = {2018-03-23},
journal = {Global Environmental Change},
volume = {50},
pages = {25--40},
abstract = {Current research shows that emotions can motivate climate engagement and action, but precisely how has received scant attention. We propose that strong emotional responses to climate change result from perceiving one’s “objects of care” as threatened by climate change, which motivates caring about climate change itself, and in turn predicts behaviour. In two studies, we find that climate scientists (N = 44) experience greater emotional intensity about climate change than do students (N = 94) and the general population (N = 205), and that patterns of emotional responses explain differences in support for climate change policy. Scientists tied their emotional responses to concern about consequences of climate change to future generations and the planet, as well as personal identities associated with responsibility to act. Our findings suggest that “objects of care” that link people to climate change may be crucial to understanding why some people feel more strongly about the issue than others, and how emotions can prompt action.},
keywords = {},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
Current research shows that emotions can motivate climate engagement and action, but precisely how has received scant attention. We propose that strong emotional responses to climate change result from perceiving one’s “objects of care” as threatened by climate change, which motivates caring about climate change itself, and in turn predicts behaviour. In two studies, we find that climate scientists (N = 44) experience greater emotional intensity about climate change than do students (N = 94) and the general population (N = 205), and that patterns of emotional responses explain differences in support for climate change policy. Scientists tied their emotional responses to concern about consequences of climate change to future generations and the planet, as well as personal identities associated with responsibility to act. Our findings suggest that “objects of care” that link people to climate change may be crucial to understanding why some people feel more strongly about the issue than others, and how emotions can prompt action.
@article{lowe_impact_2018,
title = {The impact of Earth system feedbacks on carbon budgets and climate response},
author = {Jason A Lowe and Daniel Bernie},
url = {http://rsta.royalsocietypublishing.org/content/376/2119/20170263},
doi = {10.1098/rsta.2017.0263},
issn = {1364-503X, 1471-2962},
year = {2018},
date = {2018-05-01},
urldate = {2018-04-29},
journal = {Phil. Trans. R. Soc. A},
volume = {376},
number = {2119},
pages = {20170263},
abstract = {A number of studies have examined the size of the allowable global cumulative carbon budget compatible with limiting twenty-first century global average temperature rise to below 2°C and below 1.5°C relative to pre-industrial levels. These estimates of cumulative emissions have a number of uncertainties including those associated with the climate sensitivity and the global carbon cycle. Although the IPCC fifth assessment report contained information on a range of Earth system feedbacks, such as carbon released by thawing of permafrost or methane production by wetlands as a result of climate change, the impact of many of these Earth system processes on the allowable carbon budgets remains to be quantified. Here, we make initial estimates to show that the combined impact from typically unrepresented Earth system processes may be important for the achievability of limiting warming to 1.5°C or 2°C above pre-industrial levels. The size of the effects range up to around a 350 GtCO2 budget reduction for a 1.5°C warming limit and around a 500 GtCO2 reduction for achieving a warming limit of 2°C. Median estimates for the extra Earth system forcing lead to around 100 GtCO2 and 150 GtCO2, respectively, for the two warming limits. Our estimates are equivalent to several years of anthropogenic carbon dioxide emissions at present rates. In addition to the likely reduction of the allowable global carbon budgets, the extra feedbacks also bring forward the date at which a given warming threshold is likely to be exceeded for a particular emission pathway.
This article is part of the theme issue ‘The Paris Agreement: understanding the physical and social challenges for a warming world of 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels’.},
keywords = {boundaries, climate},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
A number of studies have examined the size of the allowable global cumulative carbon budget compatible with limiting twenty-first century global average temperature rise to below 2°C and below 1.5°C relative to pre-industrial levels. These estimates of cumulative emissions have a number of uncertainties including those associated with the climate sensitivity and the global carbon cycle. Although the IPCC fifth assessment report contained information on a range of Earth system feedbacks, such as carbon released by thawing of permafrost or methane production by wetlands as a result of climate change, the impact of many of these Earth system processes on the allowable carbon budgets remains to be quantified. Here, we make initial estimates to show that the combined impact from typically unrepresented Earth system processes may be important for the achievability of limiting warming to 1.5°C or 2°C above pre-industrial levels. The size of the effects range up to around a 350 GtCO2 budget reduction for a 1.5°C warming limit and around a 500 GtCO2 reduction for achieving a warming limit of 2°C. Median estimates for the extra Earth system forcing lead to around 100 GtCO2 and 150 GtCO2, respectively, for the two warming limits. Our estimates are equivalent to several years of anthropogenic carbon dioxide emissions at present rates. In addition to the likely reduction of the allowable global carbon budgets, the extra feedbacks also bring forward the date at which a given warming threshold is likely to be exceeded for a particular emission pathway.
This article is part of the theme issue ‘The Paris Agreement: understanding the physical and social challenges for a warming world of 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels’.
@article{kriegler_pathways_2018,
title = {Pathways limiting warming to 1.5°C: a tale of turning around in no time?},
author = {Elmar Kriegler and Gunnar Luderer and Nico Bauer and Lavinia Baumstark and Shinichiro Fujimori and Alexander Popp and Joeri Rogelj and Jessica Strefler and Detlef P van Vuuren},
url = {http://rsta.royalsocietypublishing.org/content/376/2119/20160457},
doi = {10.1098/rsta.2016.0457},
issn = {1364-503X, 1471-2962},
year = {2018},
date = {2018-05-01},
urldate = {2018-04-29},
journal = {Phil. Trans. R. Soc. A},
volume = {376},
number = {2119},
pages = {20160457},
abstract = {We explore the feasibility of limiting global warming to 1.5°C without overshoot and without the deployment of carbon dioxide removal (CDR) technologies. For this purpose, we perform a sensitivity analysis of four generic emissions reduction measures to identify a lower bound on future CO2 emissions from fossil fuel combustion and industrial processes. Final energy demand reductions and electrification of energy end uses as well as decarbonization of electricity and non-electric energy supply are all considered. We find the lower bound of cumulative fossil fuel and industry CO2 emissions to be 570 GtCO2 for the period 2016–2100, around 250 GtCO2 lower than the lower end of available 1.5°C mitigation pathways generated with integrated assessment models. Estimates of 1.5°C-consistent CO2 budgets are highly uncertain and range between 100 and 900 GtCO2 from 2016 onwards. Based on our sensitivity analysis, limiting warming to 1.5°C will require CDR or terrestrial net carbon uptake if 1.5°C-consistent budgets are smaller than 650 GtCO2. The earlier CDR is deployed, the more it neutralizes post-2020 emissions rather than producing net negative emissions. Nevertheless, if the 1.5°C budget is smaller than 550 GtCO2, temporary overshoot of the 1.5°C limit becomes unavoidable if CDR cannot be ramped up faster than to 4 GtCO2 in 2040 and 10 GtCO2 in 2050.
This article is part of the theme issue ‘The Paris Agreement: understanding the physical and social challenges for a warming world of 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels’.},
keywords = {boundaries, climate},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
We explore the feasibility of limiting global warming to 1.5°C without overshoot and without the deployment of carbon dioxide removal (CDR) technologies. For this purpose, we perform a sensitivity analysis of four generic emissions reduction measures to identify a lower bound on future CO2 emissions from fossil fuel combustion and industrial processes. Final energy demand reductions and electrification of energy end uses as well as decarbonization of electricity and non-electric energy supply are all considered. We find the lower bound of cumulative fossil fuel and industry CO2 emissions to be 570 GtCO2 for the period 2016–2100, around 250 GtCO2 lower than the lower end of available 1.5°C mitigation pathways generated with integrated assessment models. Estimates of 1.5°C-consistent CO2 budgets are highly uncertain and range between 100 and 900 GtCO2 from 2016 onwards. Based on our sensitivity analysis, limiting warming to 1.5°C will require CDR or terrestrial net carbon uptake if 1.5°C-consistent budgets are smaller than 650 GtCO2. The earlier CDR is deployed, the more it neutralizes post-2020 emissions rather than producing net negative emissions. Nevertheless, if the 1.5°C budget is smaller than 550 GtCO2, temporary overshoot of the 1.5°C limit becomes unavoidable if CDR cannot be ramped up faster than to 4 GtCO2 in 2040 and 10 GtCO2 in 2050.
This article is part of the theme issue ‘The Paris Agreement: understanding the physical and social challenges for a warming world of 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels’.
@article{bovari_coping_2018,
title = {Coping With Collapse: A Stock-Flow Consistent Monetary Macrodynamics of Global Warming},
author = {Emmanuel Bovari and Gaël Giraud and Florent Mc Isaac},
url = {http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0921800916309569},
doi = {10.1016/j.ecolecon.2018.01.034},
issn = {09218009},
year = {2018},
date = {2018-05-01},
urldate = {2018-02-14},
journal = {Ecological Economics},
volume = {147},
pages = {383--398},
abstract = {This paper presents a macroeconomic model that combines the economic impact of climate change with the pivotal role of private debt. Using a Stock-Flow Consistent approach based on the Lotka–Volterra logic, we couple its nonlinear monetary dynamics of underemployment and income distribution with abatement costs. A calibration of our model at the scale of the world economy enables us to simulate various planetary scenarios. Our findings are threefold: 1) the +2 °C target is already out of reach, absent negative emissions; 2) the long-term (resp. short-term) results of climate change on economic fundamentals may lead to severe economic consequences without the implementation (resp. in case of too rapid an application) of proactive climate policies. Global warming (resp. too fast transition) forces the private sector to leverage in order to compensate for output and capital losses (resp. to lower carbon emissions), thus endangering financial stability; 3) Implementing an adequate carbon price trajectory, as well as increasing the wage share, fostering employment, and reducing private debt make it easier to avoid unintended degrowth and to reach a +2.5 °C target.},
keywords = {models},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
This paper presents a macroeconomic model that combines the economic impact of climate change with the pivotal role of private debt. Using a Stock-Flow Consistent approach based on the Lotka–Volterra logic, we couple its nonlinear monetary dynamics of underemployment and income distribution with abatement costs. A calibration of our model at the scale of the world economy enables us to simulate various planetary scenarios. Our findings are threefold: 1) the +2 °C target is already out of reach, absent negative emissions; 2) the long-term (resp. short-term) results of climate change on economic fundamentals may lead to severe economic consequences without the implementation (resp. in case of too rapid an application) of proactive climate policies. Global warming (resp. too fast transition) forces the private sector to leverage in order to compensate for output and capital losses (resp. to lower carbon emissions), thus endangering financial stability; 3) Implementing an adequate carbon price trajectory, as well as increasing the wage share, fostering employment, and reducing private debt make it easier to avoid unintended degrowth and to reach a +2.5 °C target.
@article{galafassi_raising_2018,
title = {‘Raising the temperature’: the arts in a warming planet},
author = {Diego Galafassi and Sacha Kagan and Manjana Milkoreit and María Heras and Chantal Bilodeau and Sadhbh Juarez Bourke and Andrew Merrie and Leonie Guerrero and Guðrún Pétursdóttir and Joan David Tàbara},
url = {http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1877343517300714},
doi = {10.1016/j.cosust.2017.12.010},
issn = {1877-3435},
year = {2018},
date = {2018-04-01},
urldate = {2018-02-22},
journal = {Current Opinion in Environmental Sustainability},
volume = {31},
pages = {71--79},
series = {Sustainability governance and transformation 2018},
abstract = {The search for decisive actions to remain below 1.5°C of global temperature rise will require profound cultural transformations. Yet our knowledge of how to promote and bring about such deep transformative changes in the minds and behaviours of individuals and societies is still limited. As climate change unravels and the planet becomes increasingly connected, societies will need to articulate a shared purpose that is both engaging and respectful of cultural diversity. Thus, there is a growing need to ‘raise the temperature’ of integration between multiple ways of knowing climate change. We have reviewed a range of literatures and synthesized them in order to draw out the perceived role of the arts in fostering climate transformations. Our analysis of climate-related art projects and initiatives shows increased engagement in recent years, particularly with the narrative, visual and performing arts. The arts are moving beyond raising awareness and entering the terrain of interdisciplinarity and knowledge co-creation. We conclude that climate-arts can contribute positively in fostering the imagination and emotional predisposition for the development and implementation of the transformations necessary to address the 1.5°C challenge.},
keywords = {sociology, transformation},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
The search for decisive actions to remain below 1.5°C of global temperature rise will require profound cultural transformations. Yet our knowledge of how to promote and bring about such deep transformative changes in the minds and behaviours of individuals and societies is still limited. As climate change unravels and the planet becomes increasingly connected, societies will need to articulate a shared purpose that is both engaging and respectful of cultural diversity. Thus, there is a growing need to ‘raise the temperature’ of integration between multiple ways of knowing climate change. We have reviewed a range of literatures and synthesized them in order to draw out the perceived role of the arts in fostering climate transformations. Our analysis of climate-related art projects and initiatives shows increased engagement in recent years, particularly with the narrative, visual and performing arts. The arts are moving beyond raising awareness and entering the terrain of interdisciplinarity and knowledge co-creation. We conclude that climate-arts can contribute positively in fostering the imagination and emotional predisposition for the development and implementation of the transformations necessary to address the 1.5°C challenge.
@article{barrett_stability_2018,
title = {Stability of Zero-growth Economics Analysed with a Minskyan Model},
author = {Adam B Barrett},
url = {http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0921800917306869},
doi = {10.1016/j.ecolecon.2017.10.014},
issn = {0921-8009},
year = {2018},
date = {2018-04-01},
urldate = {2017-12-19},
journal = {Ecological Economics},
volume = {146},
number = {Supplement C},
pages = {228--239},
abstract = {As humanity is becoming increasingly confronted by Earth's finite biophysical limits, there is increasing interest in questions about the stability and equitability of a zero-growth capitalist economy, most notably: if one maintains a positive interest rate for loans, can a zero-growth economy be stable? This question has been explored on a few different macroeconomic models, and both ‘yes' and ‘no’ answers have been obtained. However, economies can become unstable whether or not there is ongoing underlying growth in productivity with which to sustain growth in output. Here we attempt, for the first time, to assess via a model the relative stability of growth versus no-growth scenarios. The model employed draws from Keen's model of the Minsky financial instability hypothesis. The analysis focuses on dynamics as opposed to equilibrium, and scenarios of growth and no-growth of output (GDP) are obtained by tweaking a productivity growth input parameter. We confirm that, with or without growth, there can be both stable and unstable scenarios. To maintain stability, firms must not change their debt levels or target debt levels too quickly. Further, according to the model, the wages share is higher for zero-growth scenarios, although there are more frequent substantial drops in employment.},
keywords = {limits-to-growth},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
As humanity is becoming increasingly confronted by Earth's finite biophysical limits, there is increasing interest in questions about the stability and equitability of a zero-growth capitalist economy, most notably: if one maintains a positive interest rate for loans, can a zero-growth economy be stable? This question has been explored on a few different macroeconomic models, and both ‘yes' and ‘no’ answers have been obtained. However, economies can become unstable whether or not there is ongoing underlying growth in productivity with which to sustain growth in output. Here we attempt, for the first time, to assess via a model the relative stability of growth versus no-growth scenarios. The model employed draws from Keen's model of the Minsky financial instability hypothesis. The analysis focuses on dynamics as opposed to equilibrium, and scenarios of growth and no-growth of output (GDP) are obtained by tweaking a productivity growth input parameter. We confirm that, with or without growth, there can be both stable and unstable scenarios. To maintain stability, firms must not change their debt levels or target debt levels too quickly. Further, according to the model, the wages share is higher for zero-growth scenarios, although there are more frequent substantial drops in employment.
@article{bithas_unmasking_2018,
title = {Unmasking decoupling: Redefining the Resource Intensity of the Economy},
author = {Kostas Bithas and Panos Kalimeris},
url = {https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0048969717331194},
doi = {10.1016/j.scitotenv.2017.11.061},
issn = {0048-9697},
year = {2018},
date = {2018-04-01},
urldate = {2017-12-27},
journal = {Science of The Total Environment},
volume = {619–620},
pages = {338--351},
abstract = {Interest in investigating the complex link between resources and developments has revived recently following studies which support striking “dematerialized” growth over the last hundred years or so. This so-called decoupling effect is defined as the declining quantity of resources required for producing one unit of GDP. Decoupling studies adopt aggregate GDP as the measure of the outcome of the economy. However, this outcome is contributed by the total population which differs over time and between countries. A valid comparison should use a comparable, standardized indicator that adjusts for population size. GDP per capita, the income index, defines in monetary terms the ultimate outcome of the economy and is adopted by international organizations as the standard index for comparing economies. The income index approximates, in monetary terms, the welfare produced by the economic system and enjoyed by individuals. Recently developed alternative indexes of welfare lack broad data coverage and have limited empirical application as yet. For this reason and for ensuring direct comparison with the standard decoupling estimates, our study remains within the monetary context. The present paper re-evaluates the resources-economy link from the perspective of “the resources required for the production of one unit of GDP per capita (Income)” and hence evaluates the efficiency of turning resources into the actual outcome of the economic system. Our estimates suggest that the dependence of global economic growth on natural resources has increased by over 60% in the last 110 years (1900–2009), contrasting with the prevailing decoupling estimates which suggest a reduction by 63%. We find that the actual decoupling, which began in the mid-1970s in post-industrial economies, is counterbalanced by the intensified resource intensity of several developing economies. Accordingly, in the pursuit of sustainability, the dematerialization target needs to be more clearly incorporated into environmental policies and pervade contemporary economic thinking.},
keywords = {decoupling},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
Interest in investigating the complex link between resources and developments has revived recently following studies which support striking “dematerialized” growth over the last hundred years or so. This so-called decoupling effect is defined as the declining quantity of resources required for producing one unit of GDP. Decoupling studies adopt aggregate GDP as the measure of the outcome of the economy. However, this outcome is contributed by the total population which differs over time and between countries. A valid comparison should use a comparable, standardized indicator that adjusts for population size. GDP per capita, the income index, defines in monetary terms the ultimate outcome of the economy and is adopted by international organizations as the standard index for comparing economies. The income index approximates, in monetary terms, the welfare produced by the economic system and enjoyed by individuals. Recently developed alternative indexes of welfare lack broad data coverage and have limited empirical application as yet. For this reason and for ensuring direct comparison with the standard decoupling estimates, our study remains within the monetary context. The present paper re-evaluates the resources-economy link from the perspective of “the resources required for the production of one unit of GDP per capita (Income)” and hence evaluates the efficiency of turning resources into the actual outcome of the economic system. Our estimates suggest that the dependence of global economic growth on natural resources has increased by over 60% in the last 110 years (1900–2009), contrasting with the prevailing decoupling estimates which suggest a reduction by 63%. We find that the actual decoupling, which began in the mid-1970s in post-industrial economies, is counterbalanced by the intensified resource intensity of several developing economies. Accordingly, in the pursuit of sustainability, the dematerialization target needs to be more clearly incorporated into environmental policies and pervade contemporary economic thinking.
@article{jarvis_energy_2018,
title = {Energy Returns and The Long-run Growth of Global Industrial Society},
author = {Andrew Jarvis},
url = {https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0921800916308138},
doi = {10.1016/j.ecolecon.2017.11.005},
issn = {0921-8009},
year = {2018},
date = {2018-04-01},
urldate = {2017-12-31},
journal = {Ecological Economics},
volume = {146},
pages = {722--729},
abstract = {The extreme interconnectedness of energy and economic systems will tend to confound any attempt to estimate the energy return on investment at anything other than the global scale. Here, I apply a very simple model of global energy use to specify the dynamic characteristics of global-scale Energy Returns On Investment (EROIG). This suggests that the observed long-run relative growth rate of textasciitilde 2.5% yr− 1 in global primary energy use is associated with an equilibrium return from infrastructure investments of 2:1, with returns accruing with a time constant of 40 years. The analysis also attempts to show how growth leads to reductions in the supply efficiency of energy, and how this decline is offset by increases in the efficiency with which industrial society can extract useful work from primary energy flows. This observed preservation of the overall energy efficiency of the global energy system implicates variations in the decay/decommissioning rate of infrastructure in observed ‘long-wave’ like variations in the relative growth rate of global primary energy use, and hence EROIG.},
keywords = {energy, EROI, limits, limits-to-growth},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
The extreme interconnectedness of energy and economic systems will tend to confound any attempt to estimate the energy return on investment at anything other than the global scale. Here, I apply a very simple model of global energy use to specify the dynamic characteristics of global-scale Energy Returns On Investment (EROIG). This suggests that the observed long-run relative growth rate of textasciitilde 2.5% yr− 1 in global primary energy use is associated with an equilibrium return from infrastructure investments of 2:1, with returns accruing with a time constant of 40 years. The analysis also attempts to show how growth leads to reductions in the supply efficiency of energy, and how this decline is offset by increases in the efficiency with which industrial society can extract useful work from primary energy flows. This observed preservation of the overall energy efficiency of the global energy system implicates variations in the decay/decommissioning rate of infrastructure in observed ‘long-wave’ like variations in the relative growth rate of global primary energy use, and hence EROIG.
@article{david_tabara_positive_2018,
title = {Positive tipping points in a rapidly warming world},
author = {J David Tàbara and Niki Frantzeskaki and Katharina Hölscher and Simona Pedde and Kasper Kok and Francesco Lamperti and Jens H Christensen and Jill Jäger and Pam Berry},
url = {https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1877343517300854},
doi = {10.1016/j.cosust.2018.01.012},
issn = {1877-3435},
year = {2018},
date = {2018-04-01},
urldate = {2018-03-12},
journal = {Current Opinion in Environmental Sustainability},
volume = {31},
pages = {120--129},
series = {Sustainability governance and transformation 2018},
abstract = {The challenge of meeting the UNFCCC CoP21 goal of keeping global warming ‘well below 2 °C and to pursue efforts towards 1.5 °C’ (‘the 2–1.5 °C target’) calls for research efforts to better understand the opportunities and constraints for fundamental transformations in global systems dynamics which currently drive the unsustainable and inequitable use of the Earth's resources. To this end, this research reviews and introduces the notion of positive tipping points as emergent properties of systems–including both human capacities and structural conditions — which would allow the fast deployment of evolutionary-like transformative solutions to successfully tackle the present socio-climate quandary. Our research provides a simple procedural synthesis to help identify and coordinate the required agents’ capacities to implement transformative solutions aligned with such climate goal in different contexts. Our research shows how to identify the required capacities, conditions and potential policy interventions which could eventually lead to the emergence of positive tipping points in various social–ecological systems to address the 2–1.5 °C policy target. Our insights are based on the participatory downscaling of global Shared Socio-economic Pathways (SSPs) to Europe, the formulation of pathways of solutions within these scenarios and the results from an agent-based economic modelling.},
keywords = {4°C-and-beyond, boundaries, climate},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
The challenge of meeting the UNFCCC CoP21 goal of keeping global warming ‘well below 2 °C and to pursue efforts towards 1.5 °C’ (‘the 2–1.5 °C target’) calls for research efforts to better understand the opportunities and constraints for fundamental transformations in global systems dynamics which currently drive the unsustainable and inequitable use of the Earth's resources. To this end, this research reviews and introduces the notion of positive tipping points as emergent properties of systems–including both human capacities and structural conditions — which would allow the fast deployment of evolutionary-like transformative solutions to successfully tackle the present socio-climate quandary. Our research provides a simple procedural synthesis to help identify and coordinate the required agents’ capacities to implement transformative solutions aligned with such climate goal in different contexts. Our research shows how to identify the required capacities, conditions and potential policy interventions which could eventually lead to the emergence of positive tipping points in various social–ecological systems to address the 2–1.5 °C policy target. Our insights are based on the participatory downscaling of global Shared Socio-economic Pathways (SSPs) to Europe, the formulation of pathways of solutions within these scenarios and the results from an agent-based economic modelling.
@article{tyszczuk_culture_2018,
title = {Culture and climate change scenarios: the role and potential of the arts and humanities in responding to the ‘1.5 degrees target’},
author = {Renata Tyszczuk and Joe Smith},
url = {http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1877343517301057},
doi = {10.1016/j.cosust.2017.12.007},
issn = {1877-3435},
year = {2018},
date = {2018-04-01},
urldate = {2018-01-16},
journal = {Current Opinion in Environmental Sustainability},
volume = {31},
pages = {56--64},
series = {Sustainability governance and transformation 2018},
abstract = {This paper critically assesses the role and potential of the arts and humanities in relation to the ‘1.5 degree target’ embedded within the Paris Agreement. Specifically, it considers the purpose of scenarios in inviting thinking about transformed futures. It includes a preliminary assessment of the Culture and Climate Change: Scenarios project, an example of arts and humanities engagement with a ‘1.5°C future’. The paper argues that integrating more culturally rooted contributions into the creation and deliberation of climate change scenarios would enrich processes of future-thinking beyond climate model outputs. It would also test and extend some established practices of climate research and policy in anticipating and making futures. The paper suggests that the key characteristics of scenarios as a cultural form are that they provide space for collective, improvisational and reflexive modes of acting on and thinking about uncertain futures.},
keywords = {sociology, storytelling},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
This paper critically assesses the role and potential of the arts and humanities in relation to the ‘1.5 degree target’ embedded within the Paris Agreement. Specifically, it considers the purpose of scenarios in inviting thinking about transformed futures. It includes a preliminary assessment of the Culture and Climate Change: Scenarios project, an example of arts and humanities engagement with a ‘1.5°C future’. The paper argues that integrating more culturally rooted contributions into the creation and deliberation of climate change scenarios would enrich processes of future-thinking beyond climate model outputs. It would also test and extend some established practices of climate research and policy in anticipating and making futures. The paper suggests that the key characteristics of scenarios as a cultural form are that they provide space for collective, improvisational and reflexive modes of acting on and thinking about uncertain futures.
@article{nieto_less_2018,
title = {Less than 2 °C? An Economic-Environmental Evaluation of the Paris Agreement},
author = {Jaime Nieto and Óscar Carpintero and Luis J Miguel},
url = {https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0921800916314513},
doi = {10.1016/j.ecolecon.2017.10.007},
issn = {0921-8009},
year = {2018},
date = {2018-04-01},
urldate = {2017-10-21},
journal = {Ecological Economics},
volume = {146},
pages = {69--84},
abstract = {The literature dedicated to the analysis of the different climate agreements has usually focused on the effectiveness of the aims for emissions in the light of the advance in climate change. This article quantifies the variation in emissions that the Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) will entail and their financial allocation and policies country-by-country and regionally. The objective is evaluating the Paris Agreement feasibility regarding the INDCs and its economic and environmental constraints. The criteria through which the 161 INDCs are analysed are as follows: i/ socio-economic impact of the transition; ii/ focus on energy management; iii/ substitution of non-renewable sources; iv/ the role of technology; v/ equality of the transition; vi/ compliance with emission reductions. The results obtained show that the Paris Agreement excessively relies on external financial support (41.4%). Moreover, its unilateralist approach, the socio-economic and biophysical constraints could be the underlying cause of the ineffectiveness of the 2 °C objective. This way, each country would emit an average of 37.8% more than in the years 2005–2015. When this is weighted, the figure would be a 19.3% increase, due mainly to the increases in China and India. These figures would lead the temperatures up to 3°–4 °C.},
note = {00000},
keywords = {boundaries, climate, economics},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
The literature dedicated to the analysis of the different climate agreements has usually focused on the effectiveness of the aims for emissions in the light of the advance in climate change. This article quantifies the variation in emissions that the Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) will entail and their financial allocation and policies country-by-country and regionally. The objective is evaluating the Paris Agreement feasibility regarding the INDCs and its economic and environmental constraints. The criteria through which the 161 INDCs are analysed are as follows: i/ socio-economic impact of the transition; ii/ focus on energy management; iii/ substitution of non-renewable sources; iv/ the role of technology; v/ equality of the transition; vi/ compliance with emission reductions. The results obtained show that the Paris Agreement excessively relies on external financial support (41.4%). Moreover, its unilateralist approach, the socio-economic and biophysical constraints could be the underlying cause of the ineffectiveness of the 2 °C objective. This way, each country would emit an average of 37.8% more than in the years 2005–2015. When this is weighted, the figure would be a 19.3% increase, due mainly to the increases in China and India. These figures would lead the temperatures up to 3°–4 °C.
@article{cunsolo_ecological_2018,
title = {Ecological grief as a mental health response to climate change-related loss},
author = {Ashlee Cunsolo and Neville R Ellis},
url = {http://www.nature.com/articles/s41558-018-0092-2},
doi = {10.1038/s41558-018-0092-2},
issn = {1758-678X, 1758-6798},
year = {2018},
date = {2018-04-01},
urldate = {2018-04-09},
journal = {Nature Climate Change},
volume = {8},
number = {4},
pages = {275--281},
abstract = {Climate change is increasingly understood to impact mental health through multiple pathways of risk, including intense feelings of grief as people suffer climate-related losses to valued species, ecosystems and landscapes. Despite growing research interest, ecologically driven grief, or ‘ecological grief’, remains an underdeveloped area of inquiry. We argue that grief is a natural and legitimate response to ecological loss, and one that may become more common as climate impacts worsen. Drawing upon our own research in Northern Canada and the Australian Wheatbelt, combined with a synthesis of the literature, we offer future research directions for the study of ecological grief.},
keywords = {grief, psychology},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
Climate change is increasingly understood to impact mental health through multiple pathways of risk, including intense feelings of grief as people suffer climate-related losses to valued species, ecosystems and landscapes. Despite growing research interest, ecologically driven grief, or ‘ecological grief’, remains an underdeveloped area of inquiry. We argue that grief is a natural and legitimate response to ecological loss, and one that may become more common as climate impacts worsen. Drawing upon our own research in Northern Canada and the Australian Wheatbelt, combined with a synthesis of the literature, we offer future research directions for the study of ecological grief.
@article{palmer_biophysical_2018,
title = {A Biophysical Perspective of IPCC Integrated Energy Modelling},
author = {Graham Palmer},
url = {http://www.mdpi.com/1996-1073/11/4/839},
doi = {10.3390/en11040839},
year = {2018},
date = {2018-04-01},
urldate = {2018-04-10},
journal = {Energies},
volume = {11},
number = {4},
pages = {839},
abstract = {The following article conducts an analysis of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Fifth Assessment Report (AR5), specifically in relation to Integrated Assessment Models (IAMs). We focus on the key drivers of economic growth, how these are derived and whether IAMs properly reflect the underlying biophysical systems. Since baseline IAM scenarios project a three- to eight-fold increase in gross domestic product (GDP)-per-capita by 2100, but with consumption losses of only between 3–11%, strong mitigation seems compatible with economic growth. However, since long-term productivity and economic growth are uncertain, they are included as exogenous parameters in IAM scenarios. The biophysical economics perspective is that GDP and productivity growth are in fact emergent parameters from the economic-biophysical system. If future energy systems were to possess worse biophysical performance characteristics, we would expect lower productivity and economic growth, and therefore, the price of reaching emission targets may be significantly costlier than projected. Here, we show that IAMs insufficiently describe the energy-economy nexus and propose that those key parameters are integrated as feedbacks with the use of environmentally-extended input-output analysis (EEIOA). Further work is required to build a framework that can supplement and support IAM analysis to improve biophysical rigour.},
keywords = {energy, scenarios},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
The following article conducts an analysis of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Fifth Assessment Report (AR5), specifically in relation to Integrated Assessment Models (IAMs). We focus on the key drivers of economic growth, how these are derived and whether IAMs properly reflect the underlying biophysical systems. Since baseline IAM scenarios project a three- to eight-fold increase in gross domestic product (GDP)-per-capita by 2100, but with consumption losses of only between 3–11%, strong mitigation seems compatible with economic growth. However, since long-term productivity and economic growth are uncertain, they are included as exogenous parameters in IAM scenarios. The biophysical economics perspective is that GDP and productivity growth are in fact emergent parameters from the economic-biophysical system. If future energy systems were to possess worse biophysical performance characteristics, we would expect lower productivity and economic growth, and therefore, the price of reaching emission targets may be significantly costlier than projected. Here, we show that IAMs insufficiently describe the energy-economy nexus and propose that those key parameters are integrated as feedbacks with the use of environmentally-extended input-output analysis (EEIOA). Further work is required to build a framework that can supplement and support IAM analysis to improve biophysical rigour.
@article{schiffer_world_2018,
title = {World Energy Council’s Global Energy Scenarios to 2060},
author = {Hans-Wilhelm Schiffer and Tom Kober and Evangelos Panos},
url = {https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s12398-018-0225-3},
doi = {10.1007/s12398-018-0225-3},
issn = {0343-5377, 1866-2765},
year = {2018},
date = {2018-04-01},
urldate = {2018-04-10},
journal = {Zeitschrift für Energiewirtschaft},
pages = {1--12},
abstract = {Since 1970, global energy consumption has more than doubled. Conventional resources, in particular oil, gas and coal, had a dominant share in supply and covered most of the growth in demand in the past. Even in 2015, these fossil fuels still accounted for more than 80% of global primary energy consumption. The contribution of renewable energies to the total electricity generation was 23% in 2015, the same share as in 1970. Developments in the coming decades will differ substantially, however. Total energy consumption will rise at a much more moderate pace than in the past, e. g. by up to one third by 2060. Electricity consumption will double during this period. But even this is a considerable slowdown in growth compared with the five-fold increase seen between 1970 and 2015. And, unlike in the past, the emerging rise in consumption will essentially be covered by renewable energy sources. This is true especially for the electricity sector. This comparison with developments in the past shows the extent of the global energy transformation that may be expected in future. These developments are reflected in three global scenarios, which were published by the World Energy Council in October 2016. The results of this flagship study World Energy Scenarios to 2060 are mirrored with the main findings of the IEA’s World Energy Outlook and the U.S. EIA’s International Energy Outlook. The most important challenge indicated by the results of the mentioned studies is: the transformation, which is expected in the covered scenarios is not sufficient, in order to achieve the target of limiting the global temperature increase to less than 2 degrees Celsius compared to pre-industrial levels that was agreed by the international community of states in Paris at the end of 2015. It will be highlighted, which strategies could meet the requirement cost-efficiently—a prerequisite for its success.},
keywords = {energy, limits, scenarios},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
Since 1970, global energy consumption has more than doubled. Conventional resources, in particular oil, gas and coal, had a dominant share in supply and covered most of the growth in demand in the past. Even in 2015, these fossil fuels still accounted for more than 80% of global primary energy consumption. The contribution of renewable energies to the total electricity generation was 23% in 2015, the same share as in 1970. Developments in the coming decades will differ substantially, however. Total energy consumption will rise at a much more moderate pace than in the past, e. g. by up to one third by 2060. Electricity consumption will double during this period. But even this is a considerable slowdown in growth compared with the five-fold increase seen between 1970 and 2015. And, unlike in the past, the emerging rise in consumption will essentially be covered by renewable energy sources. This is true especially for the electricity sector. This comparison with developments in the past shows the extent of the global energy transformation that may be expected in future. These developments are reflected in three global scenarios, which were published by the World Energy Council in October 2016. The results of this flagship study World Energy Scenarios to 2060 are mirrored with the main findings of the IEA’s World Energy Outlook and the U.S. EIA’s International Energy Outlook. The most important challenge indicated by the results of the mentioned studies is: the transformation, which is expected in the covered scenarios is not sufficient, in order to achieve the target of limiting the global temperature increase to less than 2 degrees Celsius compared to pre-industrial levels that was agreed by the international community of states in Paris at the end of 2015. It will be highlighted, which strategies could meet the requirement cost-efficiently—a prerequisite for its success.
@article{roman_dynamics_2018,
title = {The Dynamics of Human–Environment Interactions in the Collapse of the Classic Maya},
author = {Sabin Roman and Erika Palmer and Markus Brede},
url = {http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0921800917305578},
doi = {10.1016/j.ecolecon.2017.11.007},
issn = {0921-8009},
year = {2018},
date = {2018-04-01},
urldate = {2018-02-03},
journal = {Ecological Economics},
volume = {146},
pages = {312--324},
abstract = {In this study we investigate the societal development of the Maya in the Southern Lowlands over a span of approximately 1400years and explore whether societal dynamics linked to the depletion of natural resources can explain the rise and fall of the Classic Maya. We propose a dynamical systems model that accounts for the state of the land, population and workers employed in swidden and intensive agriculture and monument building. Optimisation of model output to fit empirical data fixes biometric parameters to values consistent with the literature and requires that a shift from swidden to more intensive agriculture took place at around 550 CE. The latter prediction is consistent with the dating of the beginning of the Late Classical period. Thus, our model offers an explanation of the collapse of the society of the Maya and suggests that the role of droughts may have been overestimated. Consistent with previous work, the collapse can be modelled by a critical transition (supercritical Hopf bifurcation), where the critical parameter is the harvesting rate per capita of intensive agriculture. Furthermore, an extensive sensitivity analysis indicates that the model and its predictions are robust.},
keywords = {archaeology-history},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
In this study we investigate the societal development of the Maya in the Southern Lowlands over a span of approximately 1400years and explore whether societal dynamics linked to the depletion of natural resources can explain the rise and fall of the Classic Maya. We propose a dynamical systems model that accounts for the state of the land, population and workers employed in swidden and intensive agriculture and monument building. Optimisation of model output to fit empirical data fixes biometric parameters to values consistent with the literature and requires that a shift from swidden to more intensive agriculture took place at around 550 CE. The latter prediction is consistent with the dating of the beginning of the Late Classical period. Thus, our model offers an explanation of the collapse of the society of the Maya and suggests that the role of droughts may have been overestimated. Consistent with previous work, the collapse can be modelled by a critical transition (supercritical Hopf bifurcation), where the critical parameter is the harvesting rate per capita of intensive agriculture. Furthermore, an extensive sensitivity analysis indicates that the model and its predictions are robust.
@article{berry_case_2018,
title = {The case for systems thinking about climate change and mental health},
author = {Helen L Berry and Thomas D Waite and Keith B G Dear and Anthony G Capon and Virginia Murray},
url = {http://www.nature.com/articles/s41558-018-0102-4},
doi = {10.1038/s41558-018-0102-4},
issn = {1758-678X, 1758-6798},
year = {2018},
date = {2018-04-01},
urldate = {2018-04-10},
journal = {Nature Climate Change},
volume = {8},
number = {4},
pages = {282--290},
abstract = {This Perspective reviews the literature on climate change and mental health, and advocates for a systems approach, which considers the complex set of interacting distal, intermediate and proximate factors that influence mental health risk, in future research.},
keywords = {grief, psychology},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
This Perspective reviews the literature on climate change and mental health, and advocates for a systems approach, which considers the complex set of interacting distal, intermediate and proximate factors that influence mental health risk, in future research.
@article{clayton_mental_2018,
title = {Mental health risk and resilience among climate scientists},
author = {Susan Clayton},
url = {http://www.nature.com/articles/s41558-018-0123-z},
doi = {10.1038/s41558-018-0123-z},
issn = {1758-678X, 1758-6798},
year = {2018},
date = {2018-04-01},
urldate = {2018-04-10},
journal = {Nature Climate Change},
volume = {8},
number = {4},
pages = {260--261},
abstract = {Awareness of the threats to mental health posed by climate change leads to questions about the potential impacts on climate scientists because they are immersed in depressing information and may face apathy, denial and even hostility from others. But they also have sources of resilience.},
keywords = {grief, psychology},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
Awareness of the threats to mental health posed by climate change leads to questions about the potential impacts on climate scientists because they are immersed in depressing information and may face apathy, denial and even hostility from others. But they also have sources of resilience.
@article{noauthor_focus_2018,
title = {Focus on climate change and mental health},
url = {https://www.nature.com/articles/s41558-018-0128-7},
doi = {10.1038/s41558-018-0128-7},
issn = {1758-6798},
year = {2018},
date = {2018-04-01},
urldate = {2018-04-10},
journal = {Nature Climate Change},
volume = {8},
number = {4},
pages = {259},
abstract = {The health impacts of climate change are being increasingly recognized, but mental health is often excluded from this discussion. In this issue we feature a collection of articles on climate change and mental health that highlight important directions for future research.},
keywords = {grief, psychology},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
The health impacts of climate change are being increasingly recognized, but mental health is often excluded from this discussion. In this issue we feature a collection of articles on climate change and mental health that highlight important directions for future research.
@article{hempel_dynamic_2018,
title = {Dynamic Interdependencies: Problematising Criticality Assessment in the Light of Cascading Effects},
author = {Leon Hempel and Benjamin D Kraff and Robert Pelzer},
url = {http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S2212420918304783},
doi = {10.1016/j.ijdrr.2018.04.011},
issn = {22124209},
year = {2018},
date = {2018-04-01},
urldate = {2018-04-24},
journal = {International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction},
abstract = {The paper connects two interrelated discourses: criticality assessments and cascading effects. During crises, crisis managers have to constantly assess and reassess the criticality of systems and elements in order to identify potential triggers for cascading effects and to distribute efficiently available resources for mitigation. To help practitioners to make the right decisions, models are needed for the preparation phase that extend their knowledge about dependency relations and critical system elements. To do so, the paper proposes a concept of dynamic interdependencies and criticality. It is argued that dependency relations and their impact on system elements are changing over time. We maintain that when elements and system either fail or become involved, or when resources become scarce and then regain availability, then the criticality of the individual element, the system, the resource, and finally the overall situation changes as well, either positively or negatively. This article also presents a software tool which models the dynamics of cascading crisis scenarios. Finally, this software is used to reconstruct an example of a cascading power failure to demonstrate how criticality evolves dynamically.},
keywords = {systemic-risks},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
The paper connects two interrelated discourses: criticality assessments and cascading effects. During crises, crisis managers have to constantly assess and reassess the criticality of systems and elements in order to identify potential triggers for cascading effects and to distribute efficiently available resources for mitigation. To help practitioners to make the right decisions, models are needed for the preparation phase that extend their knowledge about dependency relations and critical system elements. To do so, the paper proposes a concept of dynamic interdependencies and criticality. It is argued that dependency relations and their impact on system elements are changing over time. We maintain that when elements and system either fail or become involved, or when resources become scarce and then regain availability, then the criticality of the individual element, the system, the resource, and finally the overall situation changes as well, either positively or negatively. This article also presents a software tool which models the dynamics of cascading crisis scenarios. Finally, this software is used to reconstruct an example of a cascading power failure to demonstrate how criticality evolves dynamically.
@article{dodorico_global_2018,
title = {The Global Food-Energy-Water Nexus},
author = {Paolo D'Odorico and Kyle Frankel Davis and Lorenzo Rosa and Joel A Carr and Davide Chiarelli and Jampel Dell'Angelo and Jessica Gephart and Graham K MacDonald and David A Seekell and Samir Suweis and Maria Cristina Rulli},
url = {http://doi.wiley.com/10.1029/2017RG000591},
doi = {10.1029/2017RG000591},
issn = {87551209},
year = {2018},
date = {2018-04-01},
urldate = {2018-04-27},
journal = {Reviews of Geophysics},
keywords = {agriculture-food-famine, energy, water},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
@article{hauser_running_2018,
title = {Running out of time},
author = {Oliver P Hauser},
url = {http://www.nature.com/articles/s41893-018-0052-x},
doi = {10.1038/s41893-018-0052-x},
issn = {2398-9629},
year = {2018},
date = {2018-04-01},
urldate = {2018-04-29},
journal = {Nature Sustainability},
volume = {1},
number = {4},
pages = {162--163},
abstract = {Choosing how much to take and how much to preserve from our environment is a challenging task, and every small decision counts. A behavioural experiment sheds new light on how time pressure negatively afects sustainability decisions},
keywords = {lock-in},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
Choosing how much to take and how much to preserve from our environment is a challenging task, and every small decision counts. A behavioural experiment sheds new light on how time pressure negatively afects sustainability decisions
@article{weber_effect_2018,
title = {The Effect of Population Growth on the Environment: Evidence from European Regions},
author = {Hannes Weber and Jennifer Dabbs Sciubba},
url = {https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10680-018-9486-0},
doi = {10.1007/s10680-018-9486-0},
issn = {0168-6577, 1572-9885},
year = {2018},
date = {2018-04-01},
urldate = {2018-04-29},
journal = {European Journal of Population},
pages = {1--24},
abstract = {There is a long-standing dispute on the extent to which population growth causes environmental degradation. Most studies on this link have so far analyzed cross-country data, finding contradictory results. However, these country-level analyses suffer from the high level of dissimilarity between world regions and strong collinearity of population growth, income, and other factors. We argue that regional-level analyses can provide more robust evidence, isolating the population effect from national particularities such as policies or culture. We compile a dataset of 1062 regions within 22 European countries and analyze the effect from population growth on carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions and urban land use change between 1990 and 2006. Data are analyzed using panel regressions, spatial econometric models, and propensity score matching where regions with high population growth are matched to otherwise highly similar regions exhibiting significantly less growth. We find a considerable effect from regional population growth on carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions and urban land use increase in Western Europe. By contrast, in the new member states in the East, other factors appear more important.},
keywords = {boundaries, demographics},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
There is a long-standing dispute on the extent to which population growth causes environmental degradation. Most studies on this link have so far analyzed cross-country data, finding contradictory results. However, these country-level analyses suffer from the high level of dissimilarity between world regions and strong collinearity of population growth, income, and other factors. We argue that regional-level analyses can provide more robust evidence, isolating the population effect from national particularities such as policies or culture. We compile a dataset of 1062 regions within 22 European countries and analyze the effect from population growth on carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions and urban land use change between 1990 and 2006. Data are analyzed using panel regressions, spatial econometric models, and propensity score matching where regions with high population growth are matched to otherwise highly similar regions exhibiting significantly less growth. We find a considerable effect from regional population growth on carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions and urban land use increase in Western Europe. By contrast, in the new member states in the East, other factors appear more important.
@article{basten_european_2018,
title = {European banks after the global financial crisis: a new landscape},
author = {Marisa Basten and Antonio Sánchez Serrano},
url = {https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/s41261-018-0066-3},
doi = {10.1057/s41261-018-0066-3},
issn = {1745-6452, 1750-2071},
year = {2018},
date = {2018-04-01},
urldate = {2018-05-03},
journal = {Journal of Banking Regulation},
pages = {1--23},
abstract = {The global financial crisis has created a different macroeconomic and regulatory environment for banks. In this paper, using market-based and structural indicators, we try to provide a narrative for the new landscape in which European banks operate and, at least partially, to answer the question of whether banks are now safer. To that purpose, we separately consider three periods: pre-crisis (before October 2007), crisis and post-crisis (after July 2012), over a sample of 32 banks. Our analysis shows that, after the global financial crisis, there has been a decrease in the value of market-based indicators, which, nonetheless, still remain higher than pre-crisis levels. That would mark banks as less safe than before the global financial crisis. When turning to structural indicators, our findings do not align with those from market-based indicators, as they would qualify banks as safer now. This contrast may be signalling that from a pre-crisis period characterised by high risks in the banking sector which were not priced by market participants, we may have moved to a period of lower risks in the banking sector but with market participants fully aware of them. There are significant differences between large- and medium-sized banks, which could be due to the persistence of a certain Too-Big-To-Fail assumption only for larger banks. Finally, market-based indicators tend to suggest that the bail-in and the leverage ratio have been the two pieces in the regulatory reform with the largest impact.},
keywords = {finance},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
The global financial crisis has created a different macroeconomic and regulatory environment for banks. In this paper, using market-based and structural indicators, we try to provide a narrative for the new landscape in which European banks operate and, at least partially, to answer the question of whether banks are now safer. To that purpose, we separately consider three periods: pre-crisis (before October 2007), crisis and post-crisis (after July 2012), over a sample of 32 banks. Our analysis shows that, after the global financial crisis, there has been a decrease in the value of market-based indicators, which, nonetheless, still remain higher than pre-crisis levels. That would mark banks as less safe than before the global financial crisis. When turning to structural indicators, our findings do not align with those from market-based indicators, as they would qualify banks as safer now. This contrast may be signalling that from a pre-crisis period characterised by high risks in the banking sector which were not priced by market participants, we may have moved to a period of lower risks in the banking sector but with market participants fully aware of them. There are significant differences between large- and medium-sized banks, which could be due to the persistence of a certain Too-Big-To-Fail assumption only for larger banks. Finally, market-based indicators tend to suggest that the bail-in and the leverage ratio have been the two pieces in the regulatory reform with the largest impact.
@article{oladosu_impacts_2018,
title = {Impacts of oil price shocks on the United States economy: A meta-analysis of the oil price elasticity of GDP for net oil-importing economies},
author = {Gbadebo A Oladosu and Paul N Leiby and David C Bowman and Rocio Uría-Martínez and Megan M Johnson},
url = {https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301421518300417},
doi = {10.1016/j.enpol.2018.01.032},
issn = {0301-4215},
year = {2018},
date = {2018-04-01},
urldate = {2018-02-10},
journal = {Energy Policy},
volume = {115},
pages = {523--544},
abstract = {Policy makers are interested in estimates of the potential economic impacts of oil price shocks, particularly during periods of rapid and large increases that accompany severe supply shocks. Literature estimates of the economic impacts of oil price shocks, summarized by the oil price elasticity of GDP, span a very wide range due to both fundamental economic and methodological factors. This paper presents a quantitative meta-analysis of the oil price elasticity of GDP for net oil importing countries, with a focus on the United States (US). The full range of estimates of the oil price elasticity of GDP for the US in the data is − 0.124 to + 0.017, accounting for different methodologies, data and other factors. We employ a meta-regression model that controls for key determinant factors to estimate the mean and variance of the GDP elasticity across studies. We use a robust estimation technique to deal with heterogeneity of the data and well-known econometric issues that confront meta-analysis. The resulting regression model is used to simulate the oil price elasticity of GDP for the US, with a mean of − 0.020% and 68% confidence interval of − 0.035 to − 0.006, four quarters after a shock.},
keywords = {economics, energy, limits, oil},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
Policy makers are interested in estimates of the potential economic impacts of oil price shocks, particularly during periods of rapid and large increases that accompany severe supply shocks. Literature estimates of the economic impacts of oil price shocks, summarized by the oil price elasticity of GDP, span a very wide range due to both fundamental economic and methodological factors. This paper presents a quantitative meta-analysis of the oil price elasticity of GDP for net oil importing countries, with a focus on the United States (US). The full range of estimates of the oil price elasticity of GDP for the US in the data is − 0.124 to + 0.017, accounting for different methodologies, data and other factors. We employ a meta-regression model that controls for key determinant factors to estimate the mean and variance of the GDP elasticity across studies. We use a robust estimation technique to deal with heterogeneity of the data and well-known econometric issues that confront meta-analysis. The resulting regression model is used to simulate the oil price elasticity of GDP for the US, with a mean of − 0.020% and 68% confidence interval of − 0.035 to − 0.006, four quarters after a shock.
@article{brito_armed_2018,
title = {Armed conflicts and wildlife decline: Challenges and recommendations for effective conservation policy in the Sahara-Sahel},
author = {José Carlos Brito and Sarah M Durant and Nathalie Pettorelli and John Newby and Susan Canney and Walid Algadafi and Thomas Rabeil and Pierre-André Crochet and Juan Manuel Pleguezuelos and Tim Wacher and Koen de Smet and Duarte Vasconcelos Gonçalves and Maria Joana Ferreira da Silva and Fernando Martínez-Freiría and Teresa Abáigar and João Carlos Campos and Pierre Comizzoli and Soumía Fahd and Amina Fellous and Hamissou Halilou Malam Garba and Dieng Hamidou and Abdoulaye Harouna and Mahamat Hassan Hatcha and Abdullah Nagy and Teresa Luísa Silva and Andack Saad Sow and Cândida Gomes Vale and Zbyszek Boratyński and Hugo Rebelo and Sílvia B Carvalho},
url = {http://doi.wiley.com/10.1111/conl.12446},
doi = {10.1111/conl.12446},
issn = {1755263X},
year = {2018},
date = {2018-04-01},
urldate = {2018-05-04},
journal = {Conservation Letters},
pages = {e12446},
abstract = {Increasing conflicts and social insecurity are expected to accelerate biodiversity decline and escalate illegal wildlife killing. Sahara-Sahel megafauna has experienced recent continuous decline due to unsustainable hunting pressure. Here, we provide the best available data on distribution and population trends of threatened, large vertebrates, to illustrate how escalating regional conflict (565% growth since 2011) is hastening population decline in areas that were formerly refugia for megafauna. Without conservation action, the unique and iconic biodiversity of Earth's largest desert will be forever lost. We recommend: (1) establishing strong commitments for change in global attitude toward nature; (2) engraining a culture of environmental responsibility among all stakeholders; (3) fostering environmental awareness to drive societal change; (4) reinforcing regional security and firearms control; and (5) implementing local research and wildlife monitoring schemes. We identify relevant international partners needed to tackle these challenges and to make strong policy change for biodiversity conservation and regional stability.},
keywords = {biodiversity, violence-conflicts-wars},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
Increasing conflicts and social insecurity are expected to accelerate biodiversity decline and escalate illegal wildlife killing. Sahara-Sahel megafauna has experienced recent continuous decline due to unsustainable hunting pressure. Here, we provide the best available data on distribution and population trends of threatened, large vertebrates, to illustrate how escalating regional conflict (565% growth since 2011) is hastening population decline in areas that were formerly refugia for megafauna. Without conservation action, the unique and iconic biodiversity of Earth's largest desert will be forever lost. We recommend: (1) establishing strong commitments for change in global attitude toward nature; (2) engraining a culture of environmental responsibility among all stakeholders; (3) fostering environmental awareness to drive societal change; (4) reinforcing regional security and firearms control; and (5) implementing local research and wildlife monitoring schemes. We identify relevant international partners needed to tackle these challenges and to make strong policy change for biodiversity conservation and regional stability.
@article{beehner_fragile_2018,
title = {Fragile states and the territory conundrum to countering violent nonstate actors},
author = {Lionel Beehner},
url = {https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17419166.2017.1408009},
doi = {10.1080/17419166.2017.1408009},
issn = {1741-9166, 1555-5860},
year = {2018},
date = {2018-04-01},
urldate = {2018-05-06},
journal = {Democracy and Security},
volume = {14},
number = {2},
pages = {101--127},
abstract = {The concept of controlling territorial space informs Western conventions of counterinsurgency and counterterrorism. The Islamic State surprised the West when it recently captured dozens of cities across Iraq and Syria. Eradicating failed states and ungoverned territories vis-à-vis more robust state-building also forms the backbone of U.S. efforts to reduce violence, provide order, and build stronger societies. I argue that clearing territory, while important, should be selectively employed. Greater stateness does not always correlate with reductions in violence, and conversely not all “ungoverned spaces” are terrorist safe havens. A number of these areas are natural, if nonintegrated, parts of the international system. Second, I posit that state-building can have its own negative externalities, such as pushing nonstate actors across state borders and thereby externalizing internal conflicts. The policy implications of my theory are twofold: First, territory is often a poor metric to capture military progress in the fight violent nonstate actors; second, fixing failed or fragile states does not always reduce the threat of violence but often just relocates it, as nonstate actors get squeezed out of areas of increasing stateness and move toward areas of weak stateness.},
keywords = {failed-states},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
The concept of controlling territorial space informs Western conventions of counterinsurgency and counterterrorism. The Islamic State surprised the West when it recently captured dozens of cities across Iraq and Syria. Eradicating failed states and ungoverned territories vis-à-vis more robust state-building also forms the backbone of U.S. efforts to reduce violence, provide order, and build stronger societies. I argue that clearing territory, while important, should be selectively employed. Greater stateness does not always correlate with reductions in violence, and conversely not all “ungoverned spaces” are terrorist safe havens. A number of these areas are natural, if nonintegrated, parts of the international system. Second, I posit that state-building can have its own negative externalities, such as pushing nonstate actors across state borders and thereby externalizing internal conflicts. The policy implications of my theory are twofold: First, territory is often a poor metric to capture military progress in the fight violent nonstate actors; second, fixing failed or fragile states does not always reduce the threat of violence but often just relocates it, as nonstate actors get squeezed out of areas of increasing stateness and move toward areas of weak stateness.
@article{veland_narrative_2018,
title = {Narrative matters for sustainability: the transformative role of storytelling in realizing 1.5°C futures},
author = {S Veland and M Scoville-Simonds and I Gram-Hanssen and AK Schorre and A El Khoury and MJ Nordbø and AH Lynch and G Hochachka and M Bjørkan},
url = {http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S187734351730074X},
doi = {10.1016/j.cosust.2017.12.005},
issn = {1877-3435},
year = {2018},
date = {2018-04-01},
urldate = {2018-02-19},
journal = {Current Opinion in Environmental Sustainability},
volume = {31},
pages = {41--47},
series = {Sustainability governance and transformation 2018},
abstract = {Narratives structure human comprehension, and shape our ability to imagine and achieve transformed futures within the 1.5 degree threshold. Examining tensions between narrative as a communication technique and as a spatial-temporal cognitive structure, this paper brings these different understandings together in a conversation for transformative global change. We suggest that filling the ‘information deficit’ with improved communication of a single, unifying and global narrative about Earth systems is necessary but insufficient: filling the ‘narrative deficit’ requires engagement with the protagonists, timelines, and places that provide situated agency in identifying and navigating uncertainty and risk. Transformations to sustainability will require recognizing and engaging multiple, diverse experiences of agency, a process that attention to narrative can help facilitate.},
keywords = {sociology, storytelling},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
Narratives structure human comprehension, and shape our ability to imagine and achieve transformed futures within the 1.5 degree threshold. Examining tensions between narrative as a communication technique and as a spatial-temporal cognitive structure, this paper brings these different understandings together in a conversation for transformative global change. We suggest that filling the ‘information deficit’ with improved communication of a single, unifying and global narrative about Earth systems is necessary but insufficient: filling the ‘narrative deficit’ requires engagement with the protagonists, timelines, and places that provide situated agency in identifying and navigating uncertainty and risk. Transformations to sustainability will require recognizing and engaging multiple, diverse experiences of agency, a process that attention to narrative can help facilitate.
@article{timmermann_embracing_2018,
title = {Embracing the nature of complex interactions: climate change and human survival},
author = {Cristian Timmermann},
url = {https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11016-017-0273-z},
doi = {10.1007/s11016-017-0273-z},
issn = {0815-0796, 1467-9981},
year = {2018},
date = {2018-03-01},
urldate = {2018-02-21},
journal = {Metascience},
volume = {27},
number = {1},
pages = {155--157},
abstract = {Book review Anthony McMichael with Alistair Woodward and Cameron Muir: Climate change and the health of nations: famines, fevers, and the fate of populations. New York: Oxford University Press, 2017, 392pp, £29.99 HB},
keywords = {existential-risks, philosophy, survivalism},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
Book review Anthony McMichael with Alistair Woodward and Cameron Muir: Climate change and the health of nations: famines, fevers, and the fate of populations. New York: Oxford University Press, 2017, 392pp, £29.99 HB
@article{torres_who_2018,
title = {Who would destroy the world? Omnicidal agents and related phenomena},
author = {Phil Torres},
url = {https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1359178917302859},
doi = {10.1016/j.avb.2018.02.002},
issn = {1359-1789},
year = {2018},
date = {2018-03-01},
urldate = {2018-02-24},
journal = {Aggression and Violent Behavior},
volume = {39},
pages = {129--138},
abstract = {The capacity for small groups and even single individuals to wreak unprecedented havoc on civilization is growing as a result of dual-use emerging technologies. This means that scholars should be increasingly concerned about individuals who express omnicidal, mass genocidal, anti-civilizational, or apocalyptic beliefs/desires. The present article offers a comprehensive and systematic survey of actual individuals who have harbored a death wish for humanity or destruction wish for civilization. This paper thus provides a strong foundation for future research on “agential risks” and related issues. It could also serve as a helpful resource for counterterrorism experts and global risk scholars who wish to better understand our evolving threat environment.},
keywords = {existential-risks},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
The capacity for small groups and even single individuals to wreak unprecedented havoc on civilization is growing as a result of dual-use emerging technologies. This means that scholars should be increasingly concerned about individuals who express omnicidal, mass genocidal, anti-civilizational, or apocalyptic beliefs/desires. The present article offers a comprehensive and systematic survey of actual individuals who have harbored a death wish for humanity or destruction wish for civilization. This paper thus provides a strong foundation for future research on “agential risks” and related issues. It could also serve as a helpful resource for counterterrorism experts and global risk scholars who wish to better understand our evolving threat environment.
@article{lean_observation-based_2018,
title = {Observation-based detection and attribution of 21st century climate change},
author = {Judith L Lean},
url = {http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/wcc.511/abstract},
doi = {10.1002/wcc.511},
issn = {1757-7799},
year = {2018},
date = {2018-03-01},
urldate = {2018-02-25},
journal = {Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate Change},
volume = {9},
number = {2},
pages = {n/a--n/a},
abstract = {Climate change detection and attribution have proven unexpectedly challenging during the 21st century. Earth’s global surface temperature increased less rapidly from 2000 to 2015 than during the last half of the 20th century, even though greenhouse gas concentrations continued to increase. A probable explanation is the mitigation of anthropogenic warming by La Niña cooling and declining solar irradiance. Physical climate models overestimated recent global warming because they did not generate the observed phase of La Niña cooling and may also have underestimated cooling by declining solar irradiance. Ongoing scientific investigations continue to seek alternative explanations to account for the divergence of simulated and observed climate change in the early 21st century, which IPCC termed a “global warming hiatus.” Amplified by media commentary, the suggestions by these studies that “missing” mechanisms may be influencing climate exacerbates confusion among policy makers, the public and other stakeholders about the causes and reality of modern climate change. Understanding and communicating the causes of climate change in the next 20 years may be equally challenging. Predictions of the modulation of projected anthropogenic warming by natural processes have limited skill. The rapid warming at the end of 2015, for example, is not a resumption of anthropogenic warming but rather an amplification of ongoing warming by El Niño. Furthermore, emerging feedbacks and tipping points precipitated by, for example, melting summer Arctic sea ice may alter Earth’s global temperature in ways that even the most sophisticated physical climate models do not yet replicate. This article is categorized under:
* Paleoclimates and Current Trends textgreater Climate Forcing},
keywords = {boundaries, climate},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
Climate change detection and attribution have proven unexpectedly challenging during the 21st century. Earth’s global surface temperature increased less rapidly from 2000 to 2015 than during the last half of the 20th century, even though greenhouse gas concentrations continued to increase. A probable explanation is the mitigation of anthropogenic warming by La Niña cooling and declining solar irradiance. Physical climate models overestimated recent global warming because they did not generate the observed phase of La Niña cooling and may also have underestimated cooling by declining solar irradiance. Ongoing scientific investigations continue to seek alternative explanations to account for the divergence of simulated and observed climate change in the early 21st century, which IPCC termed a “global warming hiatus.” Amplified by media commentary, the suggestions by these studies that “missing” mechanisms may be influencing climate exacerbates confusion among policy makers, the public and other stakeholders about the causes and reality of modern climate change. Understanding and communicating the causes of climate change in the next 20 years may be equally challenging. Predictions of the modulation of projected anthropogenic warming by natural processes have limited skill. The rapid warming at the end of 2015, for example, is not a resumption of anthropogenic warming but rather an amplification of ongoing warming by El Niño. Furthermore, emerging feedbacks and tipping points precipitated by, for example, melting summer Arctic sea ice may alter Earth’s global temperature in ways that even the most sophisticated physical climate models do not yet replicate. This article is categorized under:
* Paleoclimates and Current Trends textgreater Climate Forcing
@article{solecki_city_2018,
title = {City transformations in a 1.5 °C warmer world},
author = {William Solecki and Cynthia Rosenzweig and Shobhakar Dhakal and Debra Roberts and Aliyu Salisu Barau and Seth Schultz and Diana Ürge-Vorsatz},
url = {https://www.nature.com/articles/s41558-018-0101-5},
doi = {10.1038/s41558-018-0101-5},
issn = {1758-6798},
year = {2018},
date = {2018-03-01},
urldate = {2018-03-03},
journal = {Nature Climate Change},
volume = {8},
number = {3},
pages = {177--181},
abstract = {Meeting the ambitions of the Paris Agreement will require rapid and massive decarbonization of cities, as well as adaptation. Capacity and requirement differs across cities, with challenges and opportunities for transformational action in both the Global North and South.},
keywords = {cities, climate},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
Meeting the ambitions of the Paris Agreement will require rapid and massive decarbonization of cities, as well as adaptation. Capacity and requirement differs across cities, with challenges and opportunities for transformational action in both the Global North and South.
@article{heise_stories_2018,
title = {Stories for a multispecies future},
author = {Ursula K Heise},
url = {http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/2043820617739205},
doi = {10.1177/2043820617739205},
issn = {2043-8206, 2043-8214},
year = {2018},
date = {2018-03-01},
urldate = {2018-03-03},
journal = {Dialogues in Human Geography},
volume = {8},
number = {1},
pages = {96--99},
abstract = {Book review HarawayDonna, Staying with the Trouble: Making Kin the Chthulucene. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2016; 296 pp.: 978-0822362241, $24.26 (pbk).},
keywords = {sociology, storytelling},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
Book review HarawayDonna, Staying with the Trouble: Making Kin the Chthulucene. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2016; 296 pp.: 978-0822362241, $24.26 (pbk).
@article{bhattacharya_role_2018,
title = {Role of risk and information in a group formation experiment on a small-world network},
author = {Kunal Bhattacharya and Tuomas Takko and Daniel Monsivais and Kimmo Kaski},
url = {http://arxiv.org/abs/1803.01085},
year = {2018},
date = {2018-03-01},
urldate = {2018-03-12},
journal = {arXiv:1803.01085 [physics]},
abstract = {In social networks humans are generally benefited by maintaining friendships and community affiliation in which factors like homophily play key roles. These networks are far from being static, rather they are continually transforming or evolving as people from time to time decide to make new friendships and dissociate themselves from old ones. There is an element of risk in dissociations from friendships or group affiliations, especially when the decision to dissociate is done with limited information. In an experiment in the form of a cooperative game with human players we investigate the formation of groups and measure the perception of risk. In the game, the players set initially to a small world network and having limited information of its structure, coordinate their movements to form the groups. We also study the local coordination between players using a data-driven model of agents based on probability matching. Our results show that the pace of group formation is mainly dependent on local information processing of players. We find that humans even in limited information processing environments show optimal perception of risk.},
note = {arXiv: 1803.01085},
keywords = {cooperation, sociology},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
In social networks humans are generally benefited by maintaining friendships and community affiliation in which factors like homophily play key roles. These networks are far from being static, rather they are continually transforming or evolving as people from time to time decide to make new friendships and dissociate themselves from old ones. There is an element of risk in dissociations from friendships or group affiliations, especially when the decision to dissociate is done with limited information. In an experiment in the form of a cooperative game with human players we investigate the formation of groups and measure the perception of risk. In the game, the players set initially to a small world network and having limited information of its structure, coordinate their movements to form the groups. We also study the local coordination between players using a data-driven model of agents based on probability matching. Our results show that the pace of group formation is mainly dependent on local information processing of players. We find that humans even in limited information processing environments show optimal perception of risk.
@article{casari_group_2018,
title = {Group size in social-ecological systems},
author = {Marco Casari and Claudio Tagliapietra},
url = {http://www.pnas.org/lookup/doi/10.1073/pnas.1713496115},
doi = {10.1073/pnas.1713496115},
issn = {0027-8424, 1091-6490},
year = {2018},
date = {2018-03-01},
urldate = {2018-03-13},
journal = {Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences},
volume = {115},
number = {11},
pages = {2728--2733},
abstract = {What is the size of human groups for successful cooperation? Theoretically, the larger the group, the more difficult it is to sustain cooperation. We studied hundreds of villages in the Alps that harvested common property resources for almost six centuries. In the field, the average size of successful villages was around 176 individuals, although the variance was considerable. Overall, however, this average remained stable over time despite a doubling of the region’s population. Multiple social and ecological factors could, in principle, drive group size. Here, we report the predominance of social factors, such as group heterogeneity, over ecological ones, such as managing forest instead of pasture land.
Abstract
Cooperation becomes more difficult as a group becomes larger, but it is unclear where it will break down. Here, we study group size within well-functioning social-ecological systems. We consider centuries-old evidence from hundreds of communities in the Alps that harvested common property resources. Results show that the average group size remained remarkably stable over about six centuries, in contrast to a general increase in the regional population. The population more than doubled, but although single groups experienced fluctuations over time, the average group size remained stable. Ecological factors, such as managing forest instead of pasture land, played a minor role in determining group size. The evidence instead indicates that factors related to social interactions had a significant role in determining group size. We discuss possible interpretations of the findings based on constraints in individual cognition and obstacles in collective decision making.},
keywords = {sociology},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
What is the size of human groups for successful cooperation? Theoretically, the larger the group, the more difficult it is to sustain cooperation. We studied hundreds of villages in the Alps that harvested common property resources for almost six centuries. In the field, the average size of successful villages was around 176 individuals, although the variance was considerable. Overall, however, this average remained stable over time despite a doubling of the region’s population. Multiple social and ecological factors could, in principle, drive group size. Here, we report the predominance of social factors, such as group heterogeneity, over ecological ones, such as managing forest instead of pasture land.
Abstract
Cooperation becomes more difficult as a group becomes larger, but it is unclear where it will break down. Here, we study group size within well-functioning social-ecological systems. We consider centuries-old evidence from hundreds of communities in the Alps that harvested common property resources. Results show that the average group size remained remarkably stable over about six centuries, in contrast to a general increase in the regional population. The population more than doubled, but although single groups experienced fluctuations over time, the average group size remained stable. Ecological factors, such as managing forest instead of pasture land, played a minor role in determining group size. The evidence instead indicates that factors related to social interactions had a significant role in determining group size. We discuss possible interpretations of the findings based on constraints in individual cognition and obstacles in collective decision making.
@article{seeman_great_2018,
title = {The Great Recession worsened blood pressure and blood glucose levels in American adults},
author = {Teresa Seeman and Duncan Thomas and Sharon Stein Merkin and Kari Moore and Karol Watson and Arun Karlamangla},
url = {http://www.pnas.org/content/early/2018/03/06/1710502115},
doi = {10.1073/pnas.1710502115},
issn = {0027-8424, 1091-6490},
year = {2018},
date = {2018-03-01},
urldate = {2018-03-13},
journal = {Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences},
pages = {201710502},
abstract = {Longitudinal, individual-specific data from the Multi-Ethnic Study of Atherosclerosis (MESA) provide support for the hypothesis that the 2008 to 2010 Great Recession (GR) negatively impacted the health of US adults. Results further advance understanding of the relationship by (i) illuminating hypothesized greater negative impacts in population subgroups exposed to more severe impacts of the GR and (ii) explicitly controlling for confounding by individual differences in age-related changes in health over time. Analyses overcome limitations of prior work by (i) employing individual-level data that avoid concerns about ecological fallacy associated with prior reliance on group-level data, (ii) using four waves of data before the GR to estimate and control for underlying individual-level age-related trends, (iii) focusing on objective, temporally appropriate health outcomes rather than mortality, and (iv) leveraging a diverse cohort to investigate subgroup differences in the GR’s impact. Innovative individual fixed-effects modeling controlling for individual-level age-related trajectories yielded substantively important insights: (i) significant elevations post-GR for blood pressure and fasting glucose, especially among those on medication pre-GR, and (ii) reductions in prevalence and intensity of medication use post-GR. Important differences in the effects of the GR are seen across subgroups, with larger effects among younger adults (who are likely still in the labor force) and older homeowners (whose declining home wealth likely reduced financial security, with less scope for recouping losses during their lifetime); least affected were older adults without a college degree (whose greater reliance on Medicare and Social Security likely provided more protection from the recession).},
keywords = {finance, health-epidemics-pandemics},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
Longitudinal, individual-specific data from the Multi-Ethnic Study of Atherosclerosis (MESA) provide support for the hypothesis that the 2008 to 2010 Great Recession (GR) negatively impacted the health of US adults. Results further advance understanding of the relationship by (i) illuminating hypothesized greater negative impacts in population subgroups exposed to more severe impacts of the GR and (ii) explicitly controlling for confounding by individual differences in age-related changes in health over time. Analyses overcome limitations of prior work by (i) employing individual-level data that avoid concerns about ecological fallacy associated with prior reliance on group-level data, (ii) using four waves of data before the GR to estimate and control for underlying individual-level age-related trends, (iii) focusing on objective, temporally appropriate health outcomes rather than mortality, and (iv) leveraging a diverse cohort to investigate subgroup differences in the GR’s impact. Innovative individual fixed-effects modeling controlling for individual-level age-related trajectories yielded substantively important insights: (i) significant elevations post-GR for blood pressure and fasting glucose, especially among those on medication pre-GR, and (ii) reductions in prevalence and intensity of medication use post-GR. Important differences in the effects of the GR are seen across subgroups, with larger effects among younger adults (who are likely still in the labor force) and older homeowners (whose declining home wealth likely reduced financial security, with less scope for recouping losses during their lifetime); least affected were older adults without a college degree (whose greater reliance on Medicare and Social Security likely provided more protection from the recession).
@article{graeber_how_2018,
title = {How to change the course of human history},
author = {David Graeber and David Wengrow},
url = {https://www.eurozine.com/change-course-human-history/},
year = {2018},
date = {2018-03-01},
urldate = {2018-03-16},
journal = {Eurozine},
abstract = {The story we have been telling ourselves about our origins is wrong, and perpetuates the idea of inevitable social inequality. David Graeber and David Wengrow ask why the myth of 'agricultural revolution' remains so persistent, and argue that there is a whole lot more we can learn from our ancestors.},
keywords = {beliefs, sociology},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
The story we have been telling ourselves about our origins is wrong, and perpetuates the idea of inevitable social inequality. David Graeber and David Wengrow ask why the myth of 'agricultural revolution' remains so persistent, and argue that there is a whole lot more we can learn from our ancestors.
@article{kramer_energy_2018,
title = {Energy scenarios—Exploring disruption and innovation},
author = {Gert Jan Kramer},
url = {http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S221462961730378X},
doi = {10.1016/j.erss.2017.10.047},
issn = {22146296},
year = {2018},
date = {2018-03-01},
urldate = {2018-03-18},
journal = {Energy Research & Social Science},
volume = {37},
pages = {247--250},
abstract = {In this perspective I argue that the term ‘disruptive innovation’ is at best too narrow and at worst meaningless to describe the important transformation of energy in the light of the pressing problem of climate change and the ambition to reach the targets of the Paris accord. Breaking the term apart, however, into disruption and innovation opens up a rich space for scenario exploration. If we take stock of what is possible or even likely to happen over the next decades, I conclude that we would do well to be more open-minded with respect to the nature and impact of disruption, and broaden the discourse of innovation beyond technical and business innovation.},
keywords = {energy, limits},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
In this perspective I argue that the term ‘disruptive innovation’ is at best too narrow and at worst meaningless to describe the important transformation of energy in the light of the pressing problem of climate change and the ambition to reach the targets of the Paris accord. Breaking the term apart, however, into disruption and innovation opens up a rich space for scenario exploration. If we take stock of what is possible or even likely to happen over the next decades, I conclude that we would do well to be more open-minded with respect to the nature and impact of disruption, and broaden the discourse of innovation beyond technical and business innovation.
@article{bidau_doomsday_2018,
title = {Doomsday for insects? The alarming decline of insect populations around the world},
author = {Claudio J Bidau},
url = {http://insectbiodiversity.org/index.php/jib/article/view/360},
issn = {2147-7612},
year = {2018},
date = {2018-03-01},
urldate = {2018-04-03},
journal = {Journal of Insect Biodiversity},
volume = {6},
number = {3},
pages = {1--5},
abstract = {Current rates of extinction exceed largely the standard background rate and all living species can be affected. Insects, the most successful group of eukaryotic organisms from their ancient origin almost 480 my ago are no exception. Despite their fundamental roles in all terrestrial and freshwater ecosystems, insects are victims of the anthropogenic intereference (habitat destruction, overharvesting, pathogens, pesticides, pollution, urbanization, transport of invasive species, and greenhouse gases emissions) that is causing the declination of their populations around the world. Although most insects are not charismatic as many vertebrates or plants, they deserve the same level of protection as other species with which humans are more concerned. It is a duty for all entomologists to study an implement conservation measures of insect species, and educate the general public about their inmense relevance for the Biosphere.},
keywords = {biodiversity, boundaries},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
Current rates of extinction exceed largely the standard background rate and all living species can be affected. Insects, the most successful group of eukaryotic organisms from their ancient origin almost 480 my ago are no exception. Despite their fundamental roles in all terrestrial and freshwater ecosystems, insects are victims of the anthropogenic intereference (habitat destruction, overharvesting, pathogens, pesticides, pollution, urbanization, transport of invasive species, and greenhouse gases emissions) that is causing the declination of their populations around the world. Although most insects are not charismatic as many vertebrates or plants, they deserve the same level of protection as other species with which humans are more concerned. It is a duty for all entomologists to study an implement conservation measures of insect species, and educate the general public about their inmense relevance for the Biosphere.
@article{bathiany_abrupt_2018,
title = {Abrupt Climate Change in an Oscillating World},
author = {S Bathiany and M Scheffer and E H van Nes and M S Williamson and T M Lenton},
url = {https://www.nature.com/articles/s41598-018-23377-4},
doi = {10.1038/s41598-018-23377-4},
issn = {2045-2322},
year = {2018},
date = {2018-03-01},
urldate = {2018-04-05},
journal = {Scientific Reports},
volume = {8},
number = {1},
pages = {5040},
abstract = {The notion that small changes can have large consequences in the climate or ecosystems has become popular as the concept of tipping points. Typically, tipping points are thought to arise from a loss of stability of an equilibrium when external conditions are slowly varied. However, this appealingly simple view puts us on the wrong foot for understanding a range of abrupt transitions in the climate or ecosystems because complex environmental systems are never in equilibrium. In particular, they are forced by diurnal variations, the seasons, Milankovitch cycles and internal climate oscillations. Here we show how abrupt and sometimes even irreversible change may be evoked by even small shifts in the amplitude or time scale of such environmental oscillations. By using model simulations and reconciling evidence from previous studies we illustrate how these phenomena can be relevant for ecosystems and elements of the climate system including terrestrial ecosystems, Arctic sea ice and monsoons. Although the systems we address are very different and span a broad range of time scales, the phenomena can be understood in a common framework that can help clarify and unify the interpretation of abrupt shifts in the Earth system.},
keywords = {boundaries, climate},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
The notion that small changes can have large consequences in the climate or ecosystems has become popular as the concept of tipping points. Typically, tipping points are thought to arise from a loss of stability of an equilibrium when external conditions are slowly varied. However, this appealingly simple view puts us on the wrong foot for understanding a range of abrupt transitions in the climate or ecosystems because complex environmental systems are never in equilibrium. In particular, they are forced by diurnal variations, the seasons, Milankovitch cycles and internal climate oscillations. Here we show how abrupt and sometimes even irreversible change may be evoked by even small shifts in the amplitude or time scale of such environmental oscillations. By using model simulations and reconciling evidence from previous studies we illustrate how these phenomena can be relevant for ecosystems and elements of the climate system including terrestrial ecosystems, Arctic sea ice and monsoons. Although the systems we address are very different and span a broad range of time scales, the phenomena can be understood in a common framework that can help clarify and unify the interpretation of abrupt shifts in the Earth system.
@article{dosio_extreme_2018,
title = {Extreme heat waves under 1.5°C and 2°C global warming},
author = {Alessandro Dosio and Lorenzo Mentaschi and Erich M Fischer and Klaus Wyser},
url = {http://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/1748-9326/aab827},
doi = {10.1088/1748-9326/aab827},
issn = {1748-9326},
year = {2018},
date = {2018-03-01},
urldate = {2018-04-05},
journal = {Environmental Research Letters},
abstract = {Severe, extreme, and exceptional heat waves, such as those occurred over the Balkans (2007), France (2003), or Russia (2010), are associated to increased mortality, human discomfort and reduced labour productivity. Based on the results of a very high-resolution global model, we show that, even at 1.5°C warming, a significant increase in heat waves magnitude is expected over Africa, South America, and South-East Asia. Compared to a 1.5°C world, under 2°C warming the frequency of extreme heat waves would double over most of the globe. In a 1.5°C world, 13.8% of world population will be exposed to severe heat waves at least once every 5 years. This fraction becomes nearly three times larger (36.9%) under 2°C warming, i.e., a difference of around 1.7 billion people. Limiting global warming to 1.5°C will also result in around 420 million less people being frequently exposed to extreme heat waves, and textasciitilde65 million to exceptional heat waves. Nearly 700 million people (9.0% of world population) will be exposed to extreme heat waves at least once every 20 years in a 1.5°C world, but more than 2 billion people (28.2%) in a 2°C world. With current emission trends threatening even the 2°C target, our study is helpful to identify regions where limiting the warming to 1.5°C would have the strongest benefits in reducing population exposure to extreme heat.},
keywords = {boundaries, climate},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
Severe, extreme, and exceptional heat waves, such as those occurred over the Balkans (2007), France (2003), or Russia (2010), are associated to increased mortality, human discomfort and reduced labour productivity. Based on the results of a very high-resolution global model, we show that, even at 1.5°C warming, a significant increase in heat waves magnitude is expected over Africa, South America, and South-East Asia. Compared to a 1.5°C world, under 2°C warming the frequency of extreme heat waves would double over most of the globe. In a 1.5°C world, 13.8% of world population will be exposed to severe heat waves at least once every 5 years. This fraction becomes nearly three times larger (36.9%) under 2°C warming, i.e., a difference of around 1.7 billion people. Limiting global warming to 1.5°C will also result in around 420 million less people being frequently exposed to extreme heat waves, and textasciitilde65 million to exceptional heat waves. Nearly 700 million people (9.0% of world population) will be exposed to extreme heat waves at least once every 20 years in a 1.5°C world, but more than 2 billion people (28.2%) in a 2°C world. With current emission trends threatening even the 2°C target, our study is helpful to identify regions where limiting the warming to 1.5°C would have the strongest benefits in reducing population exposure to extreme heat.
@article{gross_rise_2018,
title = {The rise and fall of global forests},
author = {Michael Gross},
url = {http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S096098221830304X},
doi = {10.1016/j.cub.2018.03.003},
issn = {09609822},
year = {2018},
date = {2018-03-01},
urldate = {2018-04-05},
journal = {Current Biology},
volume = {28},
number = {6},
pages = {R245--R248},
abstract = {Big data analyses applied to the diversity found in today’s forests reveal the story
of how plants spread across the continents and diversifi ed to adapt to different
environments and climate zones. Forest diversity is also an important basis of
resilience in the face of fragmentation and climate change.},
keywords = {boundaries, forests},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
Big data analyses applied to the diversity found in today’s forests reveal the story
of how plants spread across the continents and diversifi ed to adapt to different
environments and climate zones. Forest diversity is also an important basis of
resilience in the face of fragmentation and climate change.
@article{king_implications_2018,
title = {Implications of net energy-return-on-investment for a low-carbon energy transition},
author = {Lewis C King and Jeroen CJM van den Bergh},
url = {https://doi.org/10.1038/s41560-018-0116-1},
doi = {10.1038/s41560-018-0116-1},
issn = {2058-7546},
year = {2018},
date = {2018-03-01},
journal = {Nature Energy},
abstract = {Low-carbon energy transitions aim to stay within a carbon budget that limits potential climate change to 2 °C—or well below—through a substantial growth in renewable energy sources alongside improved energy efficiency and carbon capture and storage. Current scenarios tend to overlook their low net energy returns compared to the existing fossil fuel infrastructure. Correcting from gross to net energy, we show that a low-carbon transition would probably lead to a 24–31% decline in net energy per capita by 2050, which implies a strong reversal of the recent rising trends of 0.5% per annum. Unless vast end-use efficiency savings can be achieved in the coming decades, current lifestyles might be impaired. To maintain the present net energy returns, solar and wind renewable power sources should grow two to three times faster than in other proposals. We suggest a new indicator, ‘energy return on carbon’, to assist in maximizing the net energy from the remaining carbon budget.},
keywords = {energy, EROI, limits, renewables},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
Low-carbon energy transitions aim to stay within a carbon budget that limits potential climate change to 2 °C—or well below—through a substantial growth in renewable energy sources alongside improved energy efficiency and carbon capture and storage. Current scenarios tend to overlook their low net energy returns compared to the existing fossil fuel infrastructure. Correcting from gross to net energy, we show that a low-carbon transition would probably lead to a 24–31% decline in net energy per capita by 2050, which implies a strong reversal of the recent rising trends of 0.5% per annum. Unless vast end-use efficiency savings can be achieved in the coming decades, current lifestyles might be impaired. To maintain the present net energy returns, solar and wind renewable power sources should grow two to three times faster than in other proposals. We suggest a new indicator, ‘energy return on carbon’, to assist in maximizing the net energy from the remaining carbon budget.
@article{ulyanin_forecasting_2018,
title = {Forecasting the Dynamics of the Depletion of Conventional Energy Resources},
author = {Yu A Ul’yanin and V V Kharitonov and Yu D Yurshina},
url = {https://link.springer.com/article/10.1134/S1075700718020156},
doi = {10.1134/S1075700718020156},
issn = {1075-7007, 1531-866
